Ames Research Center Safety and Occupational Health Manager John Livacich recently received a “Yes, If” coin for his proactive approach to mitigating risks and ensuring safe and reliable lifting operations.

Livacich serves as the Lifting Devices and Equipment Manager at Ames and chairs the Ames Lifting Devices and Equipment Committee. Due to Livacich’s diligence, Ames has safely completed hundreds of lifts since he was appointed to this role in 2019.

1. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Reporting Culture.
2. I know how to report safety concerns.
3. People are encouraged to report safety concerns.
4. Reported safety concerns are addressed at my Center.
5. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Just Culture.
6. I am comfortable discussing unsafe conditions without fear of reprisal.
7. People are recognized for their contributions to safety.
8. Appropriate action is taken when safety rules are not followed.
9. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Flexible Culture.
10. My Center uses information from past experiences to improve safety.
11. People in our organization manage change well.
12. Processes change to improve safety at my Center.
13. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Learning Culture.
14. We learn from our successes and our failures.
15. People at my Center actively share safety information from past experiences.
16. Employees in my work area share knowledge with each other.
17. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Engaged Culture.
18. I share responsibility for improving safety at my center.
19. Supervisors share responsibility for improving safety at my Center.
20. Leaders demonstrate they value safety by "walking the talk."
21. I have not been pressured to cut corners or compromise safety.
22. I have sufficient resources (e.g., people materials, budget) to get my job done safely.
23. What can you do to improve your Center's Safety Culture?
24. What is going well in your department/directorate regarding safety?

NPR 8705.6, Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Audits, Reviews, and Assessments establishes requirements for conducting audits, reviews and assessments to verify compliance with applicable NASA SMA requirements as required by NPD 1000.3, The NASA Organization and NPD 8700.1, NASA Policy for Safety and Mission Success in accordance with NPD 1210.2, NASA Surveys, Audits, and Reviews Policy.

1. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Reporting Culture.
2. I know how to report safety concerns.
3. People are encouraged to report safety concerns.
4. Reported safety concerns are addressed at my Center.
5. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Just Culture.
6. I am comfortable discussing unsafe conditions without fear of reprisal.
7. People are recognized for their contributions to safety.
8. Appropriate action is taken when safety rules are not followed.
9. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Flexible Culture.
10. My Center uses information from past experiences to improve safety.
11. People in our organization manage change well.
12. Processes change to improve safety at my Center.
13. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Learning Culture.
14. We learn from our successes and our failures.
15. People at my Center actively share safety information from past experiences.
16. Employees in my work area share knowledge with each other.
17. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Engaged Culture.
18. I share responsibility for improving safety at my center.
19. Supervisors share responsibility for improving safety at my Center.
20. Leaders demonstrate they value safety by "walking the talk."
21. I have not been pressured to cut corners or compromise safety.
22. I have sufficient resources (e.g., people materials, budget) to get my job done safely.

1. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Reporting Culture.
2. I know how to report safety concerns.
3. People are encouraged to report safety concerns.
4. Reported safety concerns are addressed at my Center.
5. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Just Culture.
6. I am comfortable discussing unsafe conditions without fear of reprisal.
7. People are recognized for their contributions to safety.
8. Appropriate action is taken when safety rules are not followed.
9. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Flexible Culture.
10. My CENTER uses information from past experiences to improve safety (new)
11. People in our organization manage change well.
12. Processes change to improve safety at my Center.
13. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Learning Culture.
14. We learn from our successes and our failures.
15. People at my CENTER actively share safety information from past experiences.
16. Employees in my work area share knowledge with each other.
17. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Engaged Culture.
18. I share responsibility for improving safety at my center.
19. Supervisors share responsibility for improving safety at my Center. (new)
20. Leaders demonstrate they value safety by "walking the talk."
21. In the last 12 months, I’ve been asked or felt pressured to compromise safety to get my job done.
22. I have sufficient resources (e.g., people materials, budget) to get my job done safely.

1. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Reporting Culture.
2. I know how to report safety concerns.
3. People are encouraged to report safety concerns.
4. Reported safety concerns are addressed at my Center.
5. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Just Culture.
6. I am comfortable discussing unsafe conditions without fear of reprisal.
7. People are recognized for their contributions to safety.
8. Appropriate action is taken when safety rules are not followed.
9. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Flexible Culture.
10. My Center uses information from past experiences to improve safety.
11. People in our organization manage change well.
12. Processes change to improve safety at my Center.
13. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Learning Culture.
14. We learn from our successes and our failures.
15. People at my Center actively share safety information from past experiences.
16. Employees in my work area share knowledge with each other.
17. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Engaged Culture.
18. I share responsibility for improving safety at my Center.
19. Supervisors share responsibility for improving safety at my Center.
20. Leaders demonstrate they value safety by "walking the talk."
21. Employees are protected from health and safety hazards on the job.
22. I have sufficient resources (e.g., people materials, budget) to get my job done safely.

Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) 0523 was assembled as a unique development engine for a series of tests to demonstrate safe operation of the Pratt & Whitney High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP/AT) at the High Pressure Fuel Turbine discharge temperature redline values. During the assembly of SSME 0523, Permacel P-670 tape was introduced into the fuel system during some “hands-on” process. The tape contamination went unnoticed and was left in the fuel system during the remainder of assembly and pretest activities. On June 16, 2000, a test of SSME 0523 was conducted at Stennis Space Center. During the test, the tape contamination debris set off a series of events that caused the first stage blades to fail. Post incident inspection of the engine revealed significant hardware damage to the HPFTP/AT with less significant damage to the powerhead and Main Combustion Chamber. There was no facility damage and no personnel were injured.

The consensus of the Commission and participating investigative agencies is that the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger was caused by a failure in the joint between the two lower segments of the right Solid Rocket Motor.  The specific failure was the destruction of the seals that are intended to prevent hot gases from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor.  The evidence assembled by the Commission indicates that no other element of the Space Shuttle system contributed to this failure. 

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) elected to delve deeper in the accident than simply determining the physical cause. It was obvious to the board very early on that there was an underlying problem with leadership, management and culture at NASA, specifically within the Space Shuttle Program. The CAIB released the first volume of its final report, containing 29 specific recommendations for changes to the vehicle, to the Space Shuttle Program and to NASA in general. Among those recommendations were 15 that the accident board believed should be implemented prior to returning the Space Shuttle to flight. 

The Helios Prototype HP03 vehicle was a remotely piloted aircraft designed for long-duration flight. On June 26, 2003, HP03-2 took off from the Navy’s Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai, Hawaii. The aircraft encountered turbulence and morphed into an unexpected, persistent, high-dihedral configuration. The aircraft became unstable and its design airspeed was subsequently exceeded, causing the wing leading edge to fail and the solar cells and skin on the upper surface of the wing to rip off. The aircraft impacted the ocean and was destroyed.

The Glory spacecraft was a NASA satellite mission launched March 4, 2011, as the primary payload aboard an Orbital Science Corporation Taurus XL T9 launch vehicle at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The fairing failed to separate as planned, and the additional mass of the fairing caused the trajectory to deviate and the vehicle failed to reach orbital velocity. The vehicle reentered the atmosphere and likely broke up or burned up, or both. 

Genesis was one of NASA’s Discovery missions, and its purpose was to collect samples of solar wind and return them to Earth. Launched on Aug. 8, 2001, Genesis was to provide fundamental data to help scientists understand the formation of our solar system. On Sept. 8, 2004 the Genesis sample return capsule drogue parachute did not deploy during entry, descent and landing operations. After the point of expected drogue deployment, the sample return capsule began to tumble and impacted the test range.

On April 15, 2005, the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) spacecraft was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. DART was designed to rendezvous with and perform a variety of maneuvers in close proximity to the Multiple Paths, Beyond-Line-of-Sight Communications (MUBLCOM) satellite. Approximately 11 hours into what was supposed to be a 24-hour mission, DART detected that its propellant supply was depleted. Although it was not known at the time, DART had actually collided with MUBLCOM.

The Comet Nucleus Tour, CONTOUR, is part of the NASA Discovery series of solar system exploration satellites. Launched on July 3, 2002, CONTOUR was intended to encounter at least two comets and perform a variety of investigations and analyses of the comet material. It remained in an eccentric Earth orbit until Aug. 15, 2002, when it left orbit and began the transit to the comet Encke. The mission design did not provide for telemetry coverage during the solid rocket motor burn and no provision was made to observe the burn optically. CONTOUR was programmed to re-establish telemetry contact with the ground following the burn. However, no signal was received. Active attempts to contact CONTOUR were unsuccessful. On Aug. 16, 2002, limited ground observations identified what appeared to be three separate objects on slightly divergent trajectories near but behind CONTOUR’s expected position. Further attempts to contact CONTOUR were made through Dec. 20, 2002, when NASA and Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory concluded that the spacecraft had been lost.

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s independent investigation into the Feb. 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew as a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the left wing, cause by a piece of insulating foam which separated from the left bipod ramp section of the External Tank at 81.7 seconds after launch, and struck the wing. The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle Program’s history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed national vision for human space flight. 

On Jan. 27, 1967, tragedy struck the Apollo program when a flash fire occurred in command module 012 during a launch pad test of the Apollo/Saturn space vehicle being prepared for the first piloted flight, the AS-204 mission. Three astronauts died in this tragic accident. A seven-member board conducted a comprehensive investigation to pinpoint the cause of the fire. The final report presented the results of the investigation and made specific recommendations that led to major design and engineering modifications, and revisions to test planning, test discipline, manufacturing processes and procedures, and quality control. The AS-204 mission was redesignated Apollo I in honor of the crew.

1. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Reporting Culture.
2. I know how to report safety concerns.
3. People are encouraged to report safety concerns.
4. Reported safety concerns are addressed at my Center.
5. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Just Culture.
6. I am comfortable discussing unsafe conditions with my manager if/when I see them although it may impact my work.
7. People are recognized for their contributions to safety.
8. Appropriate action is taken if safety rules are violated.
9. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Flexible Culture.
10. I have contributed to creative solutions to make things safer.
11. People in our organization manage change well.
12. Safety processes change to prevent future mishaps at my Center.
13. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Learning Culture.
14. We learn from our successes and our failures.
15. People at my CENTER actively share safety information from past experiences.
16. My CENTER uses safety information from past experiences in future decision making.
17. Please rate your immediate work area with respect to its Engaged Culture.
18. I share responsibility for improving safety at my center.
19. Leaders demonstrate they value safety by "walking the talk."
20. Employees get involved when concerned about safety.

1. Please rate your Immediate work area with respect to its Reporting Culture.
2. Please rate your Department with respect to its Reporting Culture.
3. Please rate your Center with respect to its Reporting Culture.
4. Please rate your Agency with respect to its Reporting Culture.
5. Please rate your Immediate work area with respect to its Just Culture.
6. Please rate your Department with respect to its Just Culture.
7. Please rate your Center with respect to its Just Culture.
8. Please rate your Agency with respect to its Just Culture.
9. Please rate your Immediate work area with respect to its Flexible Culture.
10. Please rate your Department with respect to its Flexible Culture.
11. Please rate your Center with respect to its Flexible Culture.
12. Please rate your Agency with respect to its Flexible Culture.
13. Please rate your Immediate work area with respect to its Learning Culture.
14. Please rate your Department with respect to its Learning Culture.
15. Please rate your Center with respect to its Learning Culture.
16. Please rate your Agency with respect to its Learning Culture.
17. Please rate your Immediate work area with respect to its Engaged Culture.
18. Please rate your Department with respect to its Engaged Culture.
19. Please rate your Center with respect to its Engaged Culture.
20. Please rate your Agency with respect to its Engaged Culture.

Addressing NASA's employees for the last time as administrator, Mike Griffin on Friday, Jan. 16, 2009, displayed the first NASA Yes-If coin.

The purpose of this Handbook is to define the NASA Safety Culture Program and to provide guidance in the development and implementation — sustainment, growth, and practice — of Safety Culture at the center level. It defines the NASA Safety Culture model, describes the Safety Culture Survey (SCS) process, and outlines training and other related resources to support the practices of Safety Culture throughout NASA.

The purpose of this NASA policy is to protect the public, NASA workforce, high-value equipment and property, and the environment from potential harm as a result of NASA activities and operations by factoring safety as an integral feature of programs, projects, technologies, operations and facilities.

This standard defines uniform Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) and risk management terms to support effective communication within NASA and with its contractors. The definitions in this standard are the official NASA SRM&QA community definitions for commonly used terms. The terms and definitions contained within this standard support the interpretation and use of documentation associated with NASA’s SRM&QA activities.

This course covers the definition of safety culture, NASA Safety Culture Five Factors, supervisors' responsibilities for supporting NASA’s Safety Culture and making supervisory decisions that reinforce NASA’s Safety Culture.

Course: HQ-SMA-SCS

Length: 1.00 hour

Audience: This course is intended for leads, supervisors and managers in the NASA workforce. This includes civil service employees, contractor employees, students and co-ops, military detailees, IPA assignees, and presidential appointees.

This course covers the definition of safety culture, NASA Safety Culture Five Factors and the learners’ responsibilities for supporting NASA’s Safety Culture.

Course Number : HQ-SMA-ONSC

Length: 2.00 hours

Audience:  This course is intended for everyone in the NASA workforce. This includes civil service employees, contractor employees, students and co-ops, military detailees, IPA assignees, and presidential appointees.

Think of NASA’s Safety Culture as the organization’s DNA. Just as DNA contains the genetic instructions that guide the development and function of every living organism, Safety Culture guides and defines safety within NASA. The NASA Safety Culture logo is designed as a DNA strand consisting of five factors to remind everyone of the importance of safety as a component of NASA work life.

Each factor in the DNA model is dependent upon the others. If one component is missing, the entire system will fail. That’s why everyone — from the newest technician to top NASA leadership — should take an active role in the agency’s safety.

An Engaged Culture ties together the other four cultures. Regardless of status or occupation, all NASA employees actively participate in safely accomplishing the agency’s mission. The key is having engaged leaders and employees who demonstrate they value safety and get involved.

In a Learning Culture, employees collect, assess and share information, both formally and informally. That includes continuing education programs such as SATERN and the Safety and Mission Assurance Technical Excellence Program, as well as resources on the NASA Engineering Network and NASA Safety Center websites. It is important for employees to learn from their experiences and apply that knowledge to their jobs.

A Flexible Culture is one that builds in resilience from the beginning. It enables an organization to adapt to unforeseen developments and make changes based on incoming trend information. It also allows an organization to push past obstacles when something new or different happens. In a Flexible Culture, operations aren’t disrupted by additional demands, but continue to operate in a steady state to successfully complete the mission.

A Culture that is Just balances the need for discipline when warranted, with rewards when earned. People clearly understand acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. There’s a sense of fairness in how business is conducted for everyone. In a Just Culture, those in authority do not “shoot the messenger” for bringing up safety concerns.

In a Reporting Culture, everyone is encouraged to report safety concerns. An atmosphere of trust exists between leadership and employees, with employees knowing that important information will be heard and acted upon appropriately. No one should ever be afraid to speak up; it could save a life.