Europa Clipper Uses New Software Assurance Process

Europa Clipper Uses New Software Assurance Process

4-minute read
Europa Clipper Uses New Software Assurance Process

Key Findings

  • The CFE distribution can be predicted with consideration of a base error rate and several related parameters for the flight project in question.
  • The most significant parameters are the number of files sent during each period and the level of “novelty” of the operations conducted during that period.
    • Although files have a different number of commands and blocks in them and these variables are not completely insignificant, their significance is not very high.
  • Most CFEs are caused by a combination of “hard” and “soft” factors.
    • Hard factors relate to the actual system components, such as hardware, software or procedures.
    • Soft factors relate to human errors.

An upcoming mission to examine one of Jupiter’s largest moons is the first to apply a new process for managing Command File Errors (CFEs) during its design phase. CFEs increase risk and impact reliability in NASA spacecraft missions.

A command file is a piece of software that is sent to a spacecraft with command and/or control functions. If not properly managed, CFEs can cause anomalies, disruptions and even mission failure.

NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Senior Engineer Leila Meshkat and her team, in conjunction with NASA’s Software Assurance Research Program (SARP), have developed a new process for managing CFEs, and she is applying that knowledge on the Europa Clipper mission. The mission, which is still early in its design phase, will send a spacecraft into Jupiter’s orbit to study the moon Europa through repeated flybys. This is the first time the process is being applied to the design phase of a mission.

“At some level, CFEs used to be kind of a mystery, a toss of a die,” said Meshkat. “We knew what the rates were, but the impact of different mitigation strategies was not explicit or quantitative.”

Meshkat, along with JPL Mission Assurance Managers Bruce Waggoner, Larry Bryant and Grant Faris, tried various Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) tools and techniques to pinpoint the root cause, prevent and predict the rates of CFEs. However, they discovered the most effective technique was to accurately model the behavior of the CFEs and use empirical methods to verify the models and examine existing assumptions about CFE management.

“We analyzed the data, and verified some of these assumptions and found some new information. Some new knowledge we gained from the actual data has changed the way people look into command file errors,” said Meshkat.

The team found that the distribution of CFEs can be predicted with consideration of a base error rate and several key parameters for the flight project in question. These key variables include the number of files sent and the “novelty level” of operations. High novelty occurs due to the relative unfamiliarity of flight activities, i.e., the first few months of a mission or unusual operations, such as impacting a comet.

The team developed a set of models and tools that are being used to manage CFEs. Their Sigma Tool, which provides a stochastic model of CFEs based on the key parameters, can be used to assess the anticipated probability of CFEs based on mission plans.

Unlike the other missions using Meshkat’s findings, which are all in the operations phase, Europa Clipper is still in the early design phase. Her CFE knowledge has given the team unique insights that they are able to incorporate into Europa Clipper’s design.

“I’m able to let them know, this is how command file errors happen. This is what we need to do to prevent them. This is how we need to take in estimations of their unreliability as we’re doing the design,” said Meshkat.

There are specific advantages of taking CFEs into consideration early in the design phase, instead of waiting for the operations phase.

“Anytime you consider an important factor earlier on as you’re doing the design, you make better informed decisions upfront, rather than considering it after the fact.  Sometimes it’s really hard to change your design after the fact, or it takes a lot of resources to change your design,” said Meshkat.

Europa Clipper is a unique mission in other ways, too. It is the first official NASA mission to use MBSE techniques exclusively, as opposed to more traditional designs.

“In general, Europa is using a very different design process than other missions have ever done… We’re using a lot more modeling for a more complete top-down design; we’re building the architecture based on analyses from other missions first and then getting into more detailed design, which is something other missions haven’t done. We’re using systems modeling techniques. We’re doing probabilistic risk assessments from the very onset of the mission. We’re doing a lot of things differently on Europa than we’ve done on other missions,” said Meshkat. 

Meshkat’s findings are being used in several missions that are in the operations phase, including NASA’s Dawn spacecraft, the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter and the Mars Science Laboratory.

People

Tim Crumbley

SA Technical Fellow

Learn more about SA Technical Fellow Tim Crumbley.

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Guille del Carmen

Technical Discipline Team Lead

Learn more about SA Technical Discipline Team Lead Guille del Carmen.

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Points of Contact

For details on contacting an SA Point of Contact (PoC), click below.

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Software Assurance Working Group

The Software Assurance Working Group (SAWG) is a group of Software Assurance (SA) professionals from across NASA who work together to help formulate NASA SA policy, standards, training, guidance, briefings and other needed items. It is also a forum to share experiences, lessons learned and useful techniques. The SAWG provides a community that can provide assistance and support to individual practitioners.

The group meets twice a month (second and fourth Wednesdays), with the second meeting of the month devoted to supporting SA Technical Excellence efforts.

SA Working Group 2022 

Past Events

Event Date Description
4 Types of Peer Reviews
12/15/2021 Webinar covering similarities and differences between the four basic types of peer review  
Software Quality Risk Scoring Workshop Part I 6/8/2021 First day of the virtual Software Quality Risk Scoring Workshop.  
Software Quality Risk Scoring Workshop Part II 6/8/2021 First day of the virtual Software Quality Risk Scoring Workshop.  
Software Quality Risk Scoring Workshop Part III 6/9/2021 Second day of the virtual Software Quality Risk Scoring Workshop.  
Software Quality Risk Scoring Workshop Part IV 6/9/2021 Second day of the virtual Software Quality Risk Scoring Workshop.
 

NASA Software Assurance Program Goals

  1. Provide risk-based performance requirements that provide flexibility for the project Software Assurance and Software Safety activities.
  2. Improve the risk, issue and finding reporting from the NASA Software Assurance and Software Safety organizations.
  3. Add value for Software Assurance and Software Safety activities and demonstrate the importance of the NASA Software Assurance activities.
  4. Provide standard tools and services for Software Assurances activities on projects.
  5. Provide measurable Software Assurance process improvement.
  6. Improve the use of data and metrics on all NASA Software Assurance activities.
  7. Focus Software Assurance activities on known software issues, including targeting Software Assurance and Software Safety research activities.
  8. Develop more efficient and automated methods for Software Assurance activities.
  9. Establish a Software Assurance services and tool sharing capability.
  10. Improve Software Assurance training and training requirements in the Safety and Mission Assurance Technical Excellence Program and across the agency.

IV&V Program

NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program provides assurance that safety- and mission-critical systems and software will operate reliably, safely and securely. The NASA IV&V Program's primary location is the Katherine Johnson IV&V Facility in Fairmont, West Virginia. The IV&V Program provides the following services:

  • System and Software Assurance: Full life cycle IV&V and independent assessments for NASA’s highest profile missions. IV&V leads to higher quality products, reduced risk, greater insight, reduced cost and knowledge transfer.
  • Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Support: Support across the agency, in-line with the development project. Hazard Analysis, Software Assurance plan development, and standards development and evaluation.
  • Mission Protection Services: Vulnerability assessment and authorization, end-to-end full life cycle security risk assessment, FedRAMP 3PAO (cloud) services, security training, and security testing (penetration testing, code analysis and vulnerability scanning).
  • Software Development, Testing and Research: Independent testing, automation and virtualization enabled through IV&V’s Jon McBride Software Testing and Research Laboratory.
IV&V Program

Learning

Launch SATERN My STEP STEP Software Assurance Curriculum Guide 

SATERN Courses

Course Title Course Number Buttons
Intermediate Software Assurance SMA-SA-WBT-201 SMA-SA-WBT-201 Details
Introduction To Software Engineering SMA-SA-WBT-206 SMA-SA-WBT-206 Details
Intermediate Software Testing SMA-SA-WBT-301 SMA-SA-WBT-301 Details
Software Requirements, Development and Management SMA-SA-WBT-303 SMA-SA-WBT-303 Details
Software Safety For Practitioners SMA-SA-WBT-306 SMA-SA-WBT-306 Details
Software Processes and Metrics SMA-SA-WBT-402 SMA-SA-WBT-402 Details

Policy and Guidance

NASA

NASA-STD-8739.8

NASA SOFTWARE ASSURANCE AND SOFTWARE SAFETY STANDARD

The purpose of the Software Assurance and Software Safety Standard is to define the requirements to implement a systematic approach to Software Assurance, software safety, and Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) for software created, acquired, provided, or maintained by or for NASA. The Software Assurance and Software Safety Standard provides a basis for personnel to perform software assurance, software safety, and IV&V activities consistently throughout the life of the software, that is, from its conception, through creation to operations and maintenance, and until the software is retired.

See NASA-STD-8739.8 

NASA-HDBK-2203

NASA Software Engineering Handbook

This handbook provides users and practitioners with guidance material for implementing the requirements of NPR 7150.2, NASA Software Engineering Requirements and the implementation of the NASA Software Assurance and Software Safety requirements in NASA-STD-8739.8, Software Assurance Standard. The use of this handbook is intended to provide "best-in-class" guidance for the implementation of safe and reliable software in support of NASA projects. The handbook is a key component of an agencywide plan to work toward a continuous and sustained Software Engineering and Software Assurance process and product improvement.

See NASA-HDBK-2203

Additional Guidance

Policy Title Buttons Buttons
NASA-STD-8739.8 NASA Software Assurance Standard NASA-STD-8739.8 Details See NASA-STD-8739.8
NPD 7120.4 NASA Engineering and Program/Project Management Policy NPD-7120-4 Details See NPD 7120.4
NPR 7120.5 NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements NPR-7120-5 Details See NPR 7120.5
NPR 7123.1 Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements NPR-7123-1 Details See NPR 7123.1
NPR 7150.2 Software Engineering Requirements NPR-7150-2 Details See NPR 7150.2
NASA-GB-8719.13 NASA Software Safety Guidebook NASA-GB-8719-13 Details See NASA-GB-8719.13
NASA-STD-8739.9 NASA Software Formal Inspections Standard NASA-STD-8739-9 Details See NASA-STD-8739.9
NASA-HDBK-8739.23 Complex Electronics Handbook for Assurance Professionals NASA-HDBK-8739.23 Details See NASA-HDBK-8739.23
SSP 50038 Computer-Based Control System Safety Requirements SSP 50038 Details See SSP 50038

SARP

Software Assurance Research Program

The Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) — hosted by NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program — is designed to provide NASA with greater knowledge about the Software Assurance (SA) practices, methods and tools needed to produce safe and reliable software.

SARP is designed to address fundamental SA problems in the field of software engineering, primarily as it relates to software safety, quality, IV&V, testability and reliability. It is intended to develop and transfer into practice SA technologies, methods and tools to support and improve the quality of the software produced by and for NASA, and to assist the agency in continuing its leadership in the development of safe, reliable and cost-effective software. Thus, by sponsoring forward-thinking research as well as addressing current needs, SARP helps assure that sufficient and appropriate software risk mitigation is applied to the software that controls and monitors NASA’s systems.

In Fiscal Year 2021, SARP is sponsoring four research projects aimed to benefit Software Assurance processes across the agency:

  1. Augmenting Requirement Analysis Tool with Artificial Intelligence
  2. Dependency Structure Matrix CAP Integration
  3. Advancing the Requirements Review Approach with NLP
  4. Software Defect Proneness: Discovering the Metrics that Matter Most

Visit SARP Website Visit SARP NEN Website