Team Aligns Software Safety Standard With Today’s Best Practices

Team Aligns Software Safety Standard With Today’s Best Practices

3-minute read
STD 8719.13C

A cross-agency team revised NASA-STD-8719.13C Software Safety Standard, and the changes took effect on May 7, 2013. This document pertains only to safety-critical software. The revisions bring the standard up to date with best practices in software safety design, analysis and development.

  Policy News   Quick Facts

WHAT'S NEW

The following are highlights from the revised standard:

1. An extensive section on criticality analysis was added. (See Section 5 and Appendix A.)

WHY IT MATTERS

Software safety criticality analyses need to be performed in order to better scope and tailor the software safety effort. If a Software Safety Litmus Test indicates the need for software safety on a project, the level of criticality helps determine the necessary software safety processes, analyses and safety design needed.

RATIONALE

While tailoring based on criticality always was expected after a Software Safety Litmus Test, there was confusion over how to perform it. The added Software Safety Criticality Analysis section provides details that help ensure software safety risks are tailored correctly. One size does not fit all for requirements. The new standard reflects the importance of considering the levels and severity of risks associated with specific programs and projects, and even different software within a project.

 


 

2. The number of requirements was reduced from 171 in revision B to 66 in revision C.

WHY IT MATTERS

The change allows more flexibility in meeting the requirements while maintaining the basic safety practices that practitioners need.

RATIONALE

Now, the requirements are clearer and streamlined. Also, requirements now covered in NPR 7150.2 NASA Software Engineering Requirements were removed, eliminating any duplication.

 


 

3. The Software Safety Litmus Test was streamlined and its use within the development life cycle was clarified. (See Appendix A.)

WHY IT MATTERS

The revisions will lead to improved understanding and application of the Software Safety Litmus Test among practitioners.

RATIONALE

Because the litmus test determines if software is safety critical, it is imperative that this test be completed correctly. For this reason, the litmus test and requirements for conducting it were made clearer and easier to read.

 


 

4. Detailed appendices were added including information on potential software issues, a list of design recommendations, and checklists for commercial off-the-shelf software, tools and facility safety. (See Appendices B through F.)

WHY IT MATTERS

The standard is now a great resource to reference when executing software assurance practices.

RATIONALE

Providing these tips and practices in the standard helps with planning software safety efforts. The Software Safety Guidebook is still the best source for detailed safety practice options.

 


 

5. Revisions throughout the standard address facility safety in addition to flight systems.

WHY IT MATTERS

The standard never directly addressed facility safety before. This component now must be considered when working on software.

RATIONALE

Software affects more than flight systems and the standard needed to better reflect that.

 


 

6. Language was added regarding the roles of acquirer and provider. (See Section 4.)

WHY IT MATTERS

The new language clearly outlines NASA’s role as the acquirer, contractors’ roles as providers and the specifics of what should be in contracts between the two parties.

RATIONALE

The additions are meant to help ensure successful acquisitions and clarify NASA’s role in overseeing them.

 


 

7. Requirements were numbered.

WHY IT MATTERS

Previously, the individual requirements were not identified by separate numbers.

RATIONALE

Numbers make it easier to reference specific requirements.

 


 

TAKE ACTION

Software Assurance practitioners, Safety and Mission Assurance technical authorities, and safety officers should review the changes to this standard and share it with project managers, software engineers and engineering technical authorities.

Have questions regarding the new standard? Contact Martha Wetherholt, NASA technical fellow for Software Assurance.