# JSC SMA FLIGHT SAFETY OFFICE

Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Spaceflight: EVA Operations

September 2024









States



Russia

	#	%_
Loss of Crew	0	0
+ Crew Injury	15	3
Early Termination	14	3
System Issue	59	13
Operational Issue	44	9

481 total spacewalks. 97 (20%) experienced significant incidents and/or close calls.

All hours represent EVA hours, not crew member hours.

All data accurate as of 8/30/2024.



EVA terminated early due to eye irritations from lithium hydroxide being blown into helmets when suit fans were run simultaneously.

A Umbilical blocked view of instruments and caused inadvertent shutdown of Gemini radio.

• Dislodged sharp-edged electric discharge ring. 0

Gemini 11, EVA 1 9/13/1966

EVA terminated early due to fatigue.

Workload exceeded cooling capacity. Apollo 11, EVA 1 7/20/1969
Difficulty passing through the LEM hatch.

Apollo 12, EVA 2

• Lunar dust abraded the EMU.

25 Hours = 24 U.S. + 1 Russia 1960s 18 EVAs = 16 U.S. + 2 Russia

Apollo 15, EVA 2

Apollo 16, EVA 2

• EMU radio antenna broke.

Skylab 2, EVA 2

Skylab 4, EVA 4

ISS-53

ISS-56

ISS-59

ISS-67

ISS-68


ISS-70

ISS-63

Skylab 3, EVA 3

## Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Spaceflight: EVA Operations

A Product of the JSC SMA Flight Safety Office



A	• E	130/20A, EVA 1 EV2 observed water droplets in water at feet.	2/11/2010 helmet and sensed					
<b>A</b>	• E	130/20A, EVA 2 EV2 exposed to ammonia from l disconnect.	<b>2/14/2010</b> eaking quick-					
A	STS-	130/20A, EVA 3 EV1 observed water droplets in	2/17/2010 helmet.					
	• E	EVA 15 EV1 exposed to ammonia from lisconnect and experienced diffquick-disconnect.	8/7/2010 eaking quick- iculty actuating					
<b>A</b>	• E	EVA 16 EV1 exposed to ammonia from l disconnect and experienced diff quick-disconnect.	8/11/2010 eaking quick- iculty actuating					
A	• (	-134/ULF6, EVA 1 Carbon dioxide sensor failure re EVA timeline.	5/20/2011 sulted in reduced					
<b>+</b>	• (	-134/ULF6, EVA 3 One EV experienced eye irritatio anti-fog agent.	<b>5/25/2011</b> on, likely from					
A	• E	EVA 18 EV2 experienced elevated EMU emperatures.	8/30/2012 I water cooling loop					
A	• (	EVA 22 Crew member observed the pres the EMU helmet.	7/9/2013 sence of water in					
	• F	EVA 23 Excess water accumulation in EV near-drowning. EVA terminated.	7/16/2013 'A helmet resulted in					
	• A	EVA 24 After returning to the airlock, an witch procedural error resulted he sublimator rendering EMU no	in water flooding					
<b>A</b>	• (	EVA 25 Crew members experienced differ ammonia fluid lines and reported lakes escaping a valve.	12/24/2013 iculty disconnecting d seeing ammonia					
	• E	EVA 32 EMU feedwater switch inadverte prior to the airlock being at vacu	10/28/2015 ently switched on num.					
<b>△</b>	• E	EVA 35 EV1 observed water in helmet. E early.	1/15/2016 VA terminated		▣	• E	EVA 62 EMU camera assembly and helmet rom helmet, but were held captive lable.	1/15/2020 lights detached by the electrical
	• (	EVA 38 Crew used glove in hammer-like	1/6/2017 manner. Glove		+	U.S.	EVA 62 One EV experienced eye irritation.	1/15/2020
<b>A</b>		emoved from flight use.	3/30/2017		+	U.S.	EVA 63 One EV experienced eye irritation.	1/20/2020
H	• 1	Helmet lights detached from helr captive by the electrical cable.	net, but were held			<b>U.S.</b>	EVA 64 Strap stuck in IV hatch during depre	1/25/2020
A	U.S.	EVA 42 One SCU failed during pre-brec o high temperatures during dep	5/12/2017 othe. Crew exposed ress.			• 1	VA ESA Nanosat deployed during EVA stru Nodule's port solar array.	<b>7/21/2022</b> ck the Service
A	• [	EVA 46 nadvertent SAFER pyro activation resulting in loss of gaseous nitrograte in EVA.	10/20/2017 on during EVA, gen. Discovered		A	• (	VA 54 Orlan-MKS low battery voltage res ermination of EVA.	<b>8/17/2022</b> sulted in early
A	U.S.	EVA 53 APFR Ingress Aid came off in creduring APFR relocation.	3/29/2019 w member's hand		A	• T	EVA 90 he Service and Cooling Umbilical after it was disconnected, resulting i on the EMU and snow in the airlock	n water and ice
2010	0s	558 Hours = 400 U.S. 88 EVAs = 63 U.S. + 25		2	2020	Os	394 Hours = 186 U.S. + 122 I 60 EVAs = 29 U.S. + 18 Russia	

Trew member experienced eye irritation, likely from anti-fog agent used in helmet.

EV2 was sprayed with ammonia and required decontamination procedure (aka "bakeout").

EV1 experienced eye irritation in both eyes.
 Attributed to leaking in-suit drink bag and anti-fog agent used in helmet.

STS-100/6A, EVA 2 4/24/2001

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Attributed to leaking in-suit drink bag and anti-fog agent used in helmet.

S EVA 10 8/3/2004 CMGs saturated during EVA. ISS went into free drift. No IVA crew.

CMGs saturated during EVA. ISS went into free dri No IVA crew.

the unlatched position, resulting in the left tower disengaging from the EMU. EVA was suspended until latch could be re-engaged by EV2.

STS-121/ULF1.1, EVA 2 7/10/2006
• EV 1's SAFER left tower latch was bumped into

STS-116/12A.1, EVA 1

• EVI's SAFER HCM inadvertently deployed during airlock egress. EVZ re-stowed HCM on second attempt. SAFER NSI (pyro) accidentally fired.

STS-120/10A, EVA 3 10/30/2007

RS EVA 20A

Jettisoned Soyuz thruster cover collided with U.S. radiator.

One EV experienced high carbon dioxide levels. EVA terminated early.

One EV experienced high carbon dioxide levels. EVA terminated early.

EVs working close to rotating port Service
Module solar array. Solar arrays should have
been parked for EVA.

EMU camera and light detached from helmet, but held captive by electrical cable.

900 Hours\* = 755 U.S. + 144 Russia

144 EVAs\* = 113 U.S. + 30 Russia

STS-126/ULF2, EVA 2

RS EVA 21 A

STS-126/ULF2, EVA 4

STS-127/2JA, EVA 3

STS-128/17A, EVA 3

One EMU unusable after EVA due to degraded

ISS Exp-9 U.S. EVA Ops
Temporary loss of ISS U.S. EVA capability due to EMU cooling loop contamination.

RS EVA 10

+ STS-98/5A, EVA 2 2/12/200
• One of the crew members reported experiencing severe foot problems during the EVA.

2/10/2001

4/22/2001

+ STS-97/4A, EVA 1

+ STS-100/6A, EVA 1

STS-98/5A, EVA 1

\* Includes 1 Chinese EVA with a duration of 1 hour. UNITED STATES ----G4C (Gemini) ----A7LB (Skylab) ISS EMU (International Space Station ----Yastreb (Soyuz) ----Berkut (Voskhod) Orlan (Soyuz, Salyut, Mir, ISS) Feitian (Shenshou, Tiangong-1, Tiangong-2, Tiangong)


	53 I	EVAs v	vith	Inc	dvertent	Rele	ase
			_	_		_	_

Mission ID	Mission
Gemini 4	STS-96/2
Gemini 10	STS-103,
Salyut 7	STS-101,
STS-41-B	STS-92/3
STS-41-C	STS-100,
STS-41-G	STS-104,
STS-51-A	STS-102,
STS-51-1	ISS-4
Mir	ISS-11
STS-88/2A	ISS-12
CTC 00 /2A	ICC 12

/2A.2a ISS-14 ISS-16

STS-121/ULF1.1 STS-124/1J STS-115/12A STS-126/ULF2 STS-115/12A ISS-24 STS-116/12A.1 ISS-25 STS-116/12A.1 STS-133/ULF5 STS-120/10A ISS-28 155,35

**Cumulative Hours** U.S. - 1781 Russian - 833 Chinese - 87 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 2020s



The JSC SMA Flight Safety Office created this graphic to highlight the risks of space exploration and to provide engineers with a summary of past experience. The chart depicts incidents during EVAs in orbit and on the lunar surface, which caused or could have caused injury, death, or the loss of the mission. Our goal is to encourage everyone to learn from the past to make present and future missions safer.

## **Event Criteria**

Incidents on the chart meet one or more of the following criteria:

- 1. Resulted in loss of life or could have resulted in loss of life under different conditions or circumstances (e.g., close calls, accidental crew detachment, water in helmet, EVA operations in thruster keep-out zone, failure to constrain/inhibit Ku Band operations...).
- 2. Resulted in injury or temporary incapacitation of a crew member, or otherwise compromised the crew member's ability to perform critical tasks, such as self-rescue (e.g., frost bite, anti-fog agent in eyes).
- 3. Resulted in the potential for critical or catastrophic damage to spacecraft (e.g., damaged hatch seal, damage to wiring harness, damage to suit, jettisoned equipment collision, or inadvertent release).
- 4. EVA aborted or terminated early to protect the crew.
- 5. Unique significance based on expert opinion (e.g., precursor events and minor events related to subsequent, more significant events, such as water-in-suit events, planetary protection, etc.).

## **Acronyms**

APFR	Articulating Portable Foot Restraint	MWS	Mini-Workstation
CMG	Control Moment Gyroscope	NASA	National Aeronautics and Space
DTO	Developmental Test Objective		Administration
EMU	Extravehicular Mobility Unit	NSI	NASA Standard Initiator
EV	EVA Crew Member	PE	Principal Expedition
EVA	Extravehicular Activity	PLSS	Primary Life Support System
FSO	Flight Safety Office	RCC	Reinforced Carbon-Carbon
HCM	Hand Control Module	RS	Russia/Russian
HST	Hubble Space Telescope	SAFER	Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue
ISS	International Space Station	SAIC	Science Applications International
IUS	Inertial Upper Stage		Corporation
IV(A)	Intravehicular (Activity)	SCU	Service and Cooling Umbilical
JSC	Johnson Space Center	SMA	Safety and Mission Assurance
LEM	Lunar Excursion Module	STS	Space Transportation System
LRV	Lunar Roving Vehicle	ULF	Utilization Logistics Flight
MMU	Manned Maneuvering Unit	U.S.	United States
MRM	Mini-Research Module		

This is a product of the JSC SMA Flight Safety Office (FSO). Our reports assemble and clarify the best-available data from multiple sources to help SMA decision makers develop a fully informed and integrated perspective of key factors involved in the risk-based decision process. For further information, please contact:

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