50
51
53
52
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
63
62
64
65
67
66
69
68
70
71
72
73
74
75
77
76
79
78
81
80
83
84
82
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
93
92
95
94
96
97
99
00
98
01
02
03
04
07
05
06
09
08
10
13
12
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
End of Shuttle Program
11
SPACE SHUTTLE - Vehicle use: Satellite, USOS Element Delivery
American winged orbital launch vehicle. The launch configuration consisted of the orbiter (housing the crew), a large external tank (storing fuel for the main engines), and two solid rocket boosters (SRBs) which provided most of the shuttle's lift during the first two minutes of flight. The space shuttle was the world's first reusable spacecraft (orbiter and SRBs were reused) and the first spacecraft in history that could carry large satellites both to and from orbit.
source: https://www.nasa.gov/returntoflight/system/system_STS.html
Variant
Shuttle
Launches
135
Failures
3
Realized
0.98
Predicted
0.97
STS-107 | 1/16/2003
LAUNCH VEHICLE DEBRIS LIBERATED DURING ASCENT CAUSED CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE TO ORBITER SPACECRAFT
113th STS Launch
28th launch of the Columbia orbiter spacecraft
A piece of insulating foam separated from the external tank 81.7 seconds after launch, while the vehicle was traveling at Mach 2.46 (1,650 mph), and struck the Columbia orbiter in the vicinity of the lower left wing leading edge. The foam impact caused catastrophic damage to the orbiter spacecraft thermal protection system and allowed hot plasma gas to enter the left wing structure during subsequent spacecraft re-entry on February 1, 2003. Excessive heating within the left wing caused the wing to fail and the spacecraft broke up during atmospheric re-entry. All seven crew members were lost. Ascent debris mitigation efforts were pursued following the accident to mitigate the risk of damage to the orbiter spacecraft during launch and ascent. On-orbit inspection and repair capabilities were also developed and implemented following the accident to mitigate the risk to future crews.
SOURCES:
Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS:
STS-51L | 1/28/1986
BOOSTER MOTOR SEAL FAILURE RESULTED IN CATASTROPHIC DESTRUCTION OF VEHICLE 73 SECONDS AFTER LIFTOFF
25th STS Launch
10th launch of the Challenger orbiter spacecraft
A combustion gas leak developed in the right solid rocket motor aft field joint shortly after solid rocket booster (SRB) ignition and launch of STS-51L. The resulting hot gas plume exiting the joint impinged upon the SRB lower attachment strut and adjacent external tank structure, weakening the structure to the point of failure. The launch vehicle and spacecraft suffered a catastrophic failure 73 seconds into flight, and all seven crew members were lost. A latent design flaw in the solid rocket motor field joints, exacerbated by cold weather temperatures at the time of launch, was the cause of the accident, and a redesign was implemented on subsequent STS flights.
SOURCES:
NASA Preferred Reliability Practive PD-ED-1257, Solid Rocket Motor Joint Reliability
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS:
STS-51F | 7/29/1985
PREMATURE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN DURING ASCENT
19th STS Launch
8th launch of the Challenger orbiter spacecraft
High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) temperature readings on Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) number 1 exceeded redline limits, resulting in a premature shutdown of SSME 1 at 5 minutes 43 seconds into flight and declaration of an abort to orbit using the two remaining operational SSMEs. At 8 minutes 13 seconds into flight, one temperature sensor on the SSME 3 HPFTP indicated anomalous temperature readings, and auto shutdown for the remaining two engines was inhibited to assure achieving an acceptable orbit and to avoid a potential high-risk trans-Atlantic abort due to suspect temperature sensor failures. The orbiter (Challenger) was placed in an acceptable orbit to support continued mission operations using three additional Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) assist burns with no further SSME anomalies. Post-flight inspection and troubleshooting of the SSMEs confirmed temperature sensor failures, and the HPFTP sensor was subsequently redesigned to improve reliability.
SOURCES:
0.98
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.92
0.89
0.98
0.97
1.00
.086
0.95
0.93
0.98
0.97
0.98
0.97
0.93
0.90
0.97
0.97
1.00
0.94
0.96
0.94
0.97
0.96
0.98
0.97
0.98
0.97
0.82
0.89
0.97
0.97
1.00
0.91
0.95
0.93
0.97
0.96
0.98
0.97
1.00
0.75
0.94
0.91
0.97
0.97
0.96
0.92
0.97
0.95
0.98
0.96
0.98
0.97
0.98
0.97
0.98
0.97
0.98
0.97
Realized Rate
Predicted Rate