50
51
53
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55
56
54
57
58
59
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61
62
64
63
65
67
66
69
68
71
72
70
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74
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76
79
77
78
81
80
83
82
85
84
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
95
94
96
97
99
98
01
00
02
03
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09
08
11
10
13
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15
14
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Long March 2F (2F and Variants) - Vehicle use: Shenzhou, Tiangong
Chinese orbital launch vehicle. The Long March 2F, also known as Chang Zheng 2F, is a human-rated version of the Long March 2E (Chang Zheng 2E) produced by the China Great Wall Industry Corporation. It is comprised of four strap-on boosters (stage 1), a central core stage (stage 2), and an upper stage (stage 3). The Long March 2F was designed for the launch of the Shenzhou spacecraft and Tiangong Space Station.
source: http://www.cgwic.com/LaunchServices/LaunchVehicle/LM2F.html
Variant
All variants
2F
2F/T
2F/G
Launches
14
7
3
4
Failures
0
0
0
0
Realized
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Predicted
0.94
0.89
0.80
0.83
11/15/1999 - H-II
CATASTROPHIC FIRST STAGE ENGINE FAILURE
7th H-II launch
first and only H-IIS launch
The launch vehicle began experiencing first stage engine problems approximately four minutes into flight, which led to ground control issuing a self-destruct command approximately eight minutes into flight, destroying the launch vehicle and payload (MTSAT). The LE-7 first stage engine hydrogen turbo pump blades failed due to high cycle fatigue, which was accelerated due to low inlet pressures operating conditions during flight. Flow-induced vibration and flaws on the surface of the blades may have also contributed to turbo pump blade failure. Enhancements were made to the first stage engine (LE-7A) and verification testing to mitigate recurrence on subsequent flights.
SOURCES:
HIIA rocket engine development
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS:
H-II 008: MTSAT launch failure; final H-II launch (15.11.99) (F)
11/29/2003 - H-IIA
BOOSTER SEPARATION FAILURE
13th H-II launch
6th H-IIA launch
A hot gas leak from one of the two solid rocket boosters (SRB-A) damaged the booster separation system, resulting in a failure to separate and jettison the affected booster following burn out. As a result of this separation failure, the H-IIA launch vehicle failed to achieve sufficient velocity and altitude and was consequently destroyed by a destruction command from the ground at 13:43:53. A design deficiency in the recently redesigned SRB-A booster resulted in excessive localized nozzle erosion and burn-through, which was determined to be the cause of the accident. Enhancements to the SRB-A booster design were implemented on subsequent launches.
SOURCES:
JAXA article on H-IIA F6 failure
Space Activities Commission investigation report (online source, Japanese text)
1.00
0.83
1.00
0.86
1.00
0.75
1.00
0.67
1.00
0.88
1.00
0.89
1.00
0.92
1.00
0.91
1.00
0.93
1.00
0.94
1.00
0.92
Realized Rate
Predicted Rate